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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Fires involving highway vehicles pose a significant hazard to the traveling public and 
emergency responders. In a typical year in the U.S. there are 266,000 highway vehicle fires, 
which are associated with 350 deaths, 1230 injuries, and $959 million in property damage. 
(Ahrens, 2005a) Fire hazards of gasoline and diesel fueled vehicles are relatively well 
understood, but Emerging Fuel Vehicles (EFVs) may introduce new and unanticipated fire 
hazards. 
Owing to economic and regulatory pressures, vehicles fueled by emerging fuels are 
appearing in greater numbers on U.S. highways. The registration of 392,000 new hybrids in the 
U.S. between 2000 and 2006 indicates how EFVs are becoming increasingly prevalent (Polk, 
2006). The Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992 requires that 75% of the light-duty vehicles 
acquired by most government agencies in metropolitan areas be fueled by alternative fuels, i.e., 
fuels not derived from petroleum. The EPAct (eere.gov, 2006) was updated in 2005. Some extra 
requirements have been added, such as requiring that all vehicles capable of running on 
alternative fuels do so 100% of the time, whereas before they were only required to do so 51% of 
the time. 
Several studies have been conducted to assess hazards of accidents involving EFVs. One 
such study sought to identify these risks before the vehicles were widely used, thus ensuring 
public acceptance of the new systems (Purdue University, 1978). Two significant conclusions 
were drawn. First, to gain rapid acceptance by the public, operating procedure information needs 
to be widely distributed. And, second, to evaluate statistics, accident data needs to be well 
documented on a large scale. This study is 30 years old and does not reflect current EFV 
technologies. 
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The objective of a more recent study sought to analyze not only fire hazards associated 
with accidents involving alternative vehicles but also the infrastructure and regular operation of 
such vehicles (Plotkin, 2000). This study determined that properties of a fuel, vehicle storage, 
and refueling are also significant contributing factors to the fire hazards of EFVs. This study 
named many of the hazards of fuels and gave some comparison to traditional fuels assuming 
generic designs. However several fuels and the determination of what fire hazards are of the 
most concern were left for future research. 
The reporting of accident data, such as by Ahrens (2005a), helps to quantify and track the 
frequency of accidents and deaths involving highway vehicle fires. By evaluating fuel system 
hazards quantitatively, such as was done for compressed natural gas buses by Chamberlain et al. 
(2005), risk comparisons between fuel systems can be made. But before a quantitative analysis 
can take place, the hazards need to be comprehensively identified and this information alone can 
provide useful safety information. 
The EPAct (eere.gov, 2006) provides a list of Alternative Fuels. EFVs are defined here to be 
vehicles fueled by Alternative Fuels as well as gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles. The emerging 
fuels and systems considered here are: 
• Gasoline-electric hybrids  
• Natural gas and liquid fuels domestically produced from natural gas 
• Hydrogen 
• Liquefied petroleum gas (propane) 
• Ethanol, methanol, and other alcohols 
• Blends of 85% or more of alcohol with gasoline 
• Coal-derived liquid fuels 
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• Electricity 
• Biodiesel (B100) 
• P-Series fuel 
 
The objectives of this work are to: 
1. Identify the fire hazards associated with emerging fuel vehicle systems. 
2. Create a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for three generic designs of 
selected vehicle types. The selected vehicle types include: 
a. Gasoline-Electric Hybrid 
b. Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) 
c. Hydrogen Fuel-Cell 
3. Create a predictive quantitative risk analysis for the same vehicle types. 
4. Identify important vehicle fire research issues 
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Chapter 2: Fire Hazards of Emerging Fuel Vehicles 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of fuel property hazards of EFVs. Following this, a 
discussion of other possible hazards identified from previous history and expert interviews is 
presented. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future research inspired by this research.  
2.1 Fuel Property Hazards 
2.1.1 Gasoline-Electric Hybrid 
Because gasoline-hybrids are powered by combustion and electricity, they have many of 
the same hazards as gasoline powered vehicles. In addition to gasoline hazards, hybrid vehicles 
can have additional, electrical fire hazards owing to the higher voltages they employ. 
2.1.2 Natural Gas 
Vehicle compressed natural gas (CNG) tanks involve high pressures. Exceeding the rated 
pressure can result in tank failure or explosion. In addition, fire can weaken tanks that may then 
cause them to rupture. 
Companies such as American Honda and FuelMaker have designed a refueling 
mechanism that can be installed in a consumer’s home. The appliance, called “Phill,” is costly, 
but it can perform a slow fill, refueling a vehicle overnight (South Coast AQMD, 2005). Having 
a CNG fuel line in the home increases some fire risks, such as the possibility of having 
accumulated vapors that can explode.  
Due to its positive Joule-Thompson coefficient, expanding CNG can lower the 
temperature below the freezing point of water. This freezing can block check valves in the open 
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position, allowing for a blow-back scenario where the fueling nozzle can be expelled with a 
pressure of up to 25,000 kPa (250 bars or about 3626 psi). 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) refueling requires training and cannot generally be 
performed by consumers owing to exposure concerns. Certain substances, such as liquid water 
from condensation, can pose a fire/explosive hazard. This hazard is referred to as Rapid Phase 
Transition (RPT). If liquid water enters a LNG pool, the LNG can undergo a RPT, potentially 
leading to a fire or explosion (Orion, 2006; WMATA, 2006; epa.gov, 2002).  
2.1.3 Hydrogen 
Hydrogen involves several unusual fire risks. One such risk is that compressed hydrogen 
vehicles use gas at high pressure and have hazards related to using pressure vessels. Hydrogen 
leaks easily due to its small molecular size and ignites easily. It has wide flammability limits, a 
high flame speed, and low ignition energy. To prevent static discharge from igniting hydrogen 
fuel during refueling the vehicles need to be grounded to eliminate the buildup of electrical 
charge. Additionally, hydrogen flames are not easily visible under daytime illumination.  
2.1.4 Propane 
Refueling a propane vehicle parallels refueling a gasoline vehicle. The refueling stations 
pump at about the same rate (about 38-45 Liters per minute). Propane systems differ from 
gasoline in that they are sealed systems. This leaves the system vulnerable to leaks from sealed 
connections between refueling components. To reduce the vulnerability, redundant safety 
devices, such as check valves, are employed to prevent back flow from the tank in the case of a 
leak. A boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion, or BLEVE, is also a hazard. This occurs when 
there is a complete failure of the tank, and it can produce high velocity projectiles and high heat 
 5
release rates. To reduce this hazard, propane fuel tanks used in highway vehicles are designed to 
be 20 times as puncture resistant as gasoline tanks at four times the normal operating pressure 
(National Propane Gas Association, 2004).  
2.1.5 Ethanol and Methanol 
Ethanol vehicle fuel is usually mixed with gasoline. E85 is 85% ethanol and 15% 
gasoline. This changes many properties compared to normal gasoline. Consumers need to be no 
more cautious with ethanol than with gasoline (Pharmco-AAPER, 2005). Blends of fuel with 
concentrations of alcohol higher than 10% require the use of alcohol-resistant foams during fire 
suppression (Kidde Fire Fighting, 2006). Additionally, alcohol fires generally produce dimmer 
flames than those of gasoline or diesel fires. 
Fire hazards involved with methanol are similar to those associated with ethanol 
(Machiele, 1990).  
2.1.6 Biodiesel  
Biodiesel poses no severe fire hazards other than the normal hazards associated with 
diesel fuel. Biodiesel refueling uses the same equipment as standard diesel refueling equipment 
(Sundan, 2004).  
2.1.7 P-Series Fuel 
P-series fueled vehicles are composed of many types of fuels, including ethanol and 
natural gas (Structure Supplies, 2006). P-series fuels can also be mixed with gasoline. Therefore, 
the fire hazards involved with P-series vehicles encompass the same hazards as ethanol and 
gasoline. P-series fuels are liquid, so additional concerns of spilling or leakage, which can lead to 
fire or explosion, are also present. P-series fuels are not currently widely used. 
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2.2 Fuel System Hazards 
Each of the emerging fuel systems presents unique hazards and challenges for emergency 
responders. Based on hazards identified in the previous section, past research, previously 
documented events, and personal communication with experts, this section discusses the hazards 
of emerging fuel systems and their effects on the traveling public and emergency responders.  
In this section several adverse effects of traditional emergency response tactics are 
observed. The descriptions of traditional emergency response methods presented here may vary 
from actual performance methods since procedures are known to vary by location or may have 
become outdated.  
The complete list of experts interviewed, diagrams of several vehicle component layouts, 
and a table of emergency response guides referenced can be found are provided in Appendix A 
through C. It should be noted that all possible component layouts found during this research were 
considered to determine the vehicle system hazards, but there were too many to include all of 
them here. The component layouts presented in Appendix B are given to aid the reader in 
understanding the systems and their operation. The layouts represent some of the most 
commonly found component layouts but are not meant to encompass all possible designs. 
With the exception of a purely electric vehicle, the fire safety concerns for a traditionally 
fueled vehicle still apply to all other EFVs. While compressed gas fueled systems do not contain 
a liquid fuel that can cause a pooling hazard, there are other components that contain other 
flammable or combustible liquids that cause the same type of pooling hazard. The following 
hazards are those that are specifically not present in traditionally fueled vehicles. 
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2.2.1 Gasoline-Electric Hybrid 
In hybrid vehicles there are two primary fire concerns that are different from traditional 
fuel vehicles: fires involving the high voltage battery pack and electrification of components 
with high voltage. If the battery pack casing is breached in a fire, toxic runoff from liquid fire 
suppression methods may need to be diverted from watershed areas. Toxic gas emissions are also 
a concern if the battery pack should become involved in a fire. These gases vary depending on 
the battery type. It may be important for firefighters to use self-contained breathing apparatus 
devices to avoid the inhalation of such toxic gases. Furthermore a fire involving the battery pack 
should not be extinguished and the battery pack should not be flooded. Firefighters should cool 
surrounding components with water while allowing the fire to burn itself out (Toyota, 2006).  
2.2.2 Compressed Natural Gas 
The most significant concern associated with CNG is the potential for high pressure, 
flammable gas leakage. In the case that the tank or fuel line is breached, a high pressure, 
flammable gas will be released that is easily ignitable. CNG can also be released via the 
operation of a pressure relief device (PRD) (Toyota, 2006).  
Dimmick has suggested that many vehicles, depending on their use, benefit from venting 
their PRDs downward and that this configuration is the most likely to be encountered (Dimmick, 
2006). A long pipeline to the release point can create other failures should the release pipeline be 
damaged in an accident. For this reason a short distance from the tank to the release point is 
preferable. The position of the release point is often placed near probable sources of ignition. An 
ignited gas jet fed by the PRD burns at a subsonic speed. While when a collection of natural gas 
burns, it is possible for it to result in a detonation instead. Thus, the gas release is generally less 
likely to cause extreme damage if it is ignited in subsonic conditions. A PRD venting upward is 
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not as close to probable sources of ignition. It is therefore less likely to be ignited and may lead 
to an explosion that is far more damaging than an ordinary burning flame jet from a downward 
venting PRD (Seiff, 2006b). This warrants that in any situation where a venting or leakage of gas 
is suspected, possible ignition of the gas in one of these two modes will be possible.  
Examples of locations where these flame scenarios could become a threat include any 
enclosed areas where escaping gas could accumulate into an ignitable mixture. Sufficiently 
cooled natural gas by the Joule-Thompson effect while escaping high pressure tanks is heavier 
than air and will travel along the ground. Natural gas at ambient temperature will rise in air. The 
venting from the PRD can be identified by the loud noise it makes while venting. In addition, to 
prevent accumulation of gas, natural gas leakage that is already ignited should not be 
extinguished as this can create an explosive re-ignition scenario. Instead it is suggested that 
surrounding components be cooled to prevent further damage.  
Also it is suggested that fires that involve a pressurized fuel tank “should be fought from 
behind…cover and be at least 50 meters from the incident. If substantial cover does not exist 
then possible evacuation of members of the public and/or rescue personnel to a distance of 200 
meters should be considered” due to the shrapnel that can be generated from the failure of the 
storage tank (Hassan et al., 2006). This recommendation comes from research performed on 
propane fueled vehicles that have tanks very similar to both CNG and Hydrogen vehicles.  
In Seiff’s documentation of natural gas vehicle incidents, one case is suspected of having 
caused a chain of PRD failures. It is suspected that due to the venting and ignition of one bus’s 
PRD the fire spread to three other buses (Seiff, 2006b). It is reasonable to assume that a chain of 
PRD activations could be caused if they all happened in close proximity to one another such as 
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in a truck yard. It is important to be aware how the operation of the PRD by one vehicle can 
possibly involve another vehicle that also employs a PRD. 
2.2.3 Hydrogen Fuel Cell 
Many hydrogen vehicles contain similar electrical components as hybrid vehicles and 
thus require similar safety procedures in regard to electrical hazards during fires. Most hydrogen 
systems do not include a liquid fuel system and so there are new and different hazards present 
than in traditional fuel systems. Similar to the CNG system, the most significant concern 
associated with the use of compressed hydrogen as fuel is the potential for high pressure, 
flammable gas leakage through a breach or the operation of the PRD (George et al., 2006). All of 
the same hazards from explosion that apply to CNG also apply to hydrogen. Hydrogen has a 
wider flammable range and so is even more likely to ignite than CNG. 
Due to the unique properties of hydrogen, it is common for flames involving only 
hydrogen to be virtually invisible to the human eye. Thus, in any situation where hydrogen is 
suspected to be involved, it is prudent to use more extensive fire detection measures. These 
include using a thermal sensing camera to look for flames before approaching a possible fuel 
leakage scenario. This can also be performed by approaching the vehicle with a long handled 
broom preferably with straw bristles that will ignite when the bristles encounter the flames. 
For compressed fuels it is important to note that unlike gasoline, fighting the fire from an 
uphill position is not recommended. Since the hydrogen gas rises, it is important to fight fires 
and approach the vehicle from upwind, where gas accumulation is less likely. Hydrogen can be 
lighter or heavier than air depending on its temperature. If it is heavier than air it will travel 
along the ground accumulating in low areas until it is heated by contact with the ground and 
dispersion in air. Fighting these fires upwind is the most appropriate approach to avoid areas 
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where gas has accumulated in explosive mixture quantities. For these reasons identifying not 
only that a compressed gas is the source of a fire is important, but also what type (Slaughter, 
2003).  
2.2.4 Propane 
The same hazards apply to propane fuel systems as applied to CNG except in the cases 
where there is a gas leakage and explosion. Propane is heavier than air and will sink to the 
ground. For propane, liquid leakage and BLEVE are principal fire considerations. It is important 
to note that for both CNG and propane fuel systems on the road, after-market conversions may 
be provided by vehicle owners, and as such may not have installed PRDs in the system. Thus, 
any situation where a PRD has not already proven its presence should be treated as a possible 
BLEVE hazard, or explosion hazard for CNG and Hydrogen systems, further necessitating the 
large exclusion zone for fighting these fires as mentioned in the quote of the suggested CNG 
exclusion zone earlier in this paper. 
2.2.5 Ethanol and Methanol   
For systems that may contain ethanol or methanol, extra precaution should be taken to 
apply only alcohol resistant foams during fire suppression if foams are used. It is also not 
recommended to apply water from straight-stream nozzles because this can cause the fire to 
spread. 
2.3 Hazard Identification Future Research 
Several issues have arisen during the previously discussed hazard identification research 
that warrants further research. These issues are summarized as follows: 
 11
• Many of the current EFV symbols are similar and it is hard for emergency responders to 
differentiate vehicle fuel types, especially from a distance. Further research should be 
conducted to develop easily differentiable symbols or electronic markers. There is a large 
difference in the safe firefighting distance and priorities of suppression for situations 
where there is an explosion hazard versus when there is not. Thus immediate vehicle 
identification is critical to maintaining safe suppression measure. 
• Rupture and possible explosion of vehicle fuel tanks is a significant fire hazard. Further 
research is needed to determine safe exclusion zone distances for each type of emerging 
fuel. This would then also define the distance at which their previously mentioned 
symbols or electronic markers would need to be identifiable. 
• In trying to acquire statistics on EFV fires, it was found that they are not directly 
identifiable by their Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) or in emergency responder 
accident reports. VINs do identify model number; however the VINs of EFV models 
must be identified for each manufacturer separately since they are not consistent between 
manufacturers. Additionally there is no “fuel system” data entry on emergency responder 
accident report forms or in either the NFIRS or FARS databases. Therefore the accident 
data based on accident reports cannot be used to identify statistics for EFVs alone. 
Further research could improve these systems so that EFVs can be identified easily for 
statistical purposes. 
• The buoyancy and dispersion of released natural gas from the system remains an 
uncertainty that still needs to be addressed. Further research into modeling the behavior 
of natural gas release would provide more definite characteristics of how fire scenarios 
may form. 
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Chapter 3: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
3.1 FMEA Methods 
FMEAs were created for three generic EFV fuel systems to identify possible modes of 
failure and the consequences of those failures. These are generalizations and different designs 
could lead to different FMEA results. A hazard is defined here as a possible source of injury or 
damage. Failure is defined here as a function that causes injury or damage by either creating a 
fire hazard at any time or creating a hazard during fire suppression activities. Using statistics 
acquired in the future, these initial ratings can be replaced with quantitative ratings for greater 
accuracy.  
The FMEA method in this research adopts characteristics of a number of different 
sources from related industries such as mechanical design, (Otto et al., 2001; Crow, 2006; 
Dyadem Press, 2003) fire protection, (Mowrer et al., 1989; US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
1975; Vesely et al., 1981) and SAE (FMEA, 1995). Both failure modes and consequences are 
identified by consulting the literature on the emerging fuels, EFV components, laboratory 
experiments, and accidents. The FMEA uses the likelihood of the failure modes and the severity 
of consequences to understand the relative risk associated with each failure mode (Dyadem 
Press, 2003). The highest risk modes of failure are assessed by the risk priority number (RPN). 
Diagrams of the common fuel system component layouts used in the FMEA and the full 
FMEA are provided in Appendices B and D. The diagrams show the general component layouts 
that were considered to represent the systems in the FMEA. The FMEA summary table of the six 
highest risk modes of failure for particular components of each system is shown in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1. Summary of design FMEA fire related hazards 
Component Name
Potential Failure 
















Fuel Tank (And fuel 
lines)
Cracking Flammable leakage 6 Protective casing 
breach.
6 36
Hybrid Vehicle (HV) 
Battery Pack
Electrical Short Arcing, electrifies other components 
with high voltage and possible ignition 
source.
9 Short Circuit 4 36
Power Cables (with 
GFI)
Electrical Short Arcing, electrifies other components 












Hybrid Vehicle (HV) 
Battery Pack
Cracking Corrosive liquid leakage, toxic fire 
hazard, loss of power to electric motor, 
loss of power to vehicle.















Check Valve Freezing Prevents isolation, high pressure 
flammable back flow at the fill 
receptacle.









Fill Receptacle Seal 
Embrittlement












Storage Tank Localized Flame Rupture, Flammable Leakage 9 Fuel line failure 5 45
Direct Current High 
Voltage Cables 
(without GFI)




High Voltage Cables 
(without GFI)
Electrical Short Arcing. 9 Protective 
Casing Breach
7 63








Flame Leaks large volume of high pressure 
flammable gas in presence of ignition 
source.
6 Flame 9 54
High Pressure Tank 
Inlet Lines
Cracking Leaks high pressure flammable gas. 7 Excessive 
loading
7 49
Low Pressure Tank 
Outlet Lines
Localized flame Leaks low pressure flammable gas in 
presence of ignition source.






































The modes of failure describe all the ways a component is capable of failing. Each 
identified failure mode can have a number of effects. Each of these effects is given a risk rating 
and is briefly described. The effect is then rated on a qualitative scale of severity numbering 
from 1, where no injuries or damage is expected, to 10, where death or complete destruction is 
expected in the event of failure. The most significant predicted causes of failure are described 
and ranked on another qualitative scale, also from 1 – 10. A hazard with a probability of 1 is not 
expected to cause a fire even in the lifetime of one out of one million vehicle systems. A rating 
of 10 represents that the probability of the failure scenario is assured to occur during the lifetime 
of at least one out of one million vehicle systems. Lastly, the product of the severity and 
probability ratings gives the RPN from which a determination of the priority of the hazard 
extends. The explicit rating descriptions are specified to describe EFV failures on the scales 
based on common industry practice (Otto and Wood, 2001, Dyadem, 2003). 
3.2 FMEA Results 
From the FMEA several issues with each vehicle became evident. The issues identified 
for each individual vehicle type are addressed in the following sections. Details of related failure 
scenarios from literature review and expert interviews are given to describe possible scenarios 
and justification for the qualitative result. 
3.2.1 Gasoline-Electric Hybrid 
The vehicle evaluated by the FMEA used an inertia switch to detect crashes, however not 
all vehicles use this method of detection. Other crash sensing systems can be defeated by 
different means resulting in the same hazard. 
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Failures involving the numerous electrical systems in this EFV type may result from a 
collision. Failures of the electrical system may also not be the initial cause of a fire, but during a 
fire scenario the prior failure of the system may cause further injury or damage by failing to 
activate safety devices.  
Failure of the electronic monitoring system can allow fire hazards to become worse. For 
example, sensors may fail to activate shut-off valves when fuel leakage occurs. The unfamiliarity 
of these systems increases the probability that the system may be incorrectly calibrated or 
otherwise improperly modified during construction, maintenance, or repair of this EFV type 
(Scott, 2006).  
In some hybrid designs, the battery pack is not protected by a ground fault interruption 
(GFI) system. If contacting the terminals directly due to an event such as a collision may result in 
a fire. However, many hybrids include the GFI within the battery pack. GFIs are actually one of 
many similar electrical safety systems employed by vehicle manufacturers. GFIs are the most 
commonly found method in the current hybrid vehicle fleet and so they were the method chosen 
for consideration in this analysis. GFIs may also be known by other names. Toyota names its 
GFI system a “Ground Fault Monitoring System” though the operation is the same as a standard 
GFI (Toyota, 2006). 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 305 specifies the requirement that electrical 
systems should remain isolated from the passenger compartment at all times (U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2005). It is possible that future vehicle designs will have different components 
that may lower the probability and therefore the risk of failures as well. This could be true of any 
vehicle system that has different components from the one evaluated here. Electrical hazards are 
hazards which involve arcing or shorting of an electrical circuit. While electrical hazards may 
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not often be the cause of fire itself it can be caused by a fire or events that cause a fire. The 
electrical hazard may then affect people involved in a fire scenario or the emergency response to 
it and thus it is considered among the fire hazards. Scott, an expert in EFV safety training, says 
that he would “feel confident that fire will not result in electrocution” (Scott, 2006). Given this 
expert’s opinion the probably of such a scenario is assumed to be low, but the consequence of 
even a rare occurrence is still significant. This value of consequence results in a notable risk 
result in the FMEA. As such, all possible measures to deactivate the high voltage system should 
be taken to avoid the risk of electrocution, such as turning off the car and disabling the battery 
with the manual breaker switch. The Toyota Camry Hybrid Emergency Response Manual carries 
the following warning that supports this recommendation. “Failure to shut off the vehicle before 
emergency response procedures are performed may result in serious injury or death from…the 
high voltage electrical system” (Toyota, 2006). 
It should also be noted that in many vehicles their components will retain some voltage 
for some time after the vehicle is shut off or disabled. In the case of the Toyota Camry Hybrid 
Emergency Response Manual, “the SRS (Safety Restraint System) may remain powered up for 
up to 90 seconds after the vehicle is shut off or disabled.” (Toyota, 2006)  It is never assumed to 
be safe to cut through any high voltage marked components, often identified by an orange 
coating (Dimmick, 2006).  
In addition to the aforementioned electrification issue the lack of detection of a collision 
from a malfunctioning inertia switch could leave components improperly electrified and active. 
Following this a breach in the fuel tank caused by a collision could be ignited by arcing electrical 
components.  
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Cracking of the battery pack can result in the exposure of the internals of the battery. The 
electrolyte inside the battery being exposed in a fire can emit different toxic gases depending of 
the battery type. The explicit hazards vary with battery type, since some containing large 
quantities of corrosive liquid and others do not. According to Scott, “some large bus batteries can 
have as little as two soda cans of liquid in them…only to keep the paper moist.” (Scott, 2006) 
The leakage of fuel from the tank or the fuel line causing pooling is a significantly severe 
fire hazard resulting in a flammable or explosive scenario. Depending on the configuration of the 
tank in the vehicle the probability of the tank being ruptured in a collision varies. 
3.2.2 Compressed Natural Gas 
Over-pressurization of the fuel tank can result from the malfunction of a fueling station’s 
pressure detection and relief devices. This is most likely to happen during refueling if dirt enters 
the system. Or, it could result from weakening of the tank due to mechanical or chemical 
damage. Weakening of the tank can result from a collision or acid or Ultra Violet (UV) light 
exposure. Seiff (Seiff, 2006a) has documented a number of natural gas vehicle fire incidents. 
One of these incidents exemplifies a situation where UV exposure was suspected as the cause of 
a CNG tank’s rupture (Seiff, 2006b).  
“A 12-year old aluminum-lined Type 2 cylinder produced by NGV Systems ruptured on 
a pick-up truck at Alabama Gas Co. No injuries were reported. The cylinder was suspected of 
having external physical and ultraviolet (UV) damage as well as being over-pressurized” (Seiff, 
2006b). 
The overpressure can result in a rupture and rapid leakage of the contained flammable 
gas. Two significant fire scenarios can result from this situation. If rapidly expelled gas is 
ignited, a large flame will result. Alternatively, leaked gas could accumulate and ignite resulting 
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in detonation. Seiff has documented a case where the PRD of a CNG vehicle was vented upward 
without being ignited while venting, which led to an explosion (Seiff, 2006b).  
The following account identified the circumstances associated with one incident: “An 
eleven foot, six inch tall Command bus shuttling race goers around Belmont Park attempted to 
go under a 9’ 6” underpass. The entire supporting frame of the roof mounted fuel storage system 
was pushed back approximately 10 feet. A high pressure fuel line detached causing a violent 
decompression of the entire fuel storage system. As the released gas rose, it was trapped by the 
overpass and ignited by a damaged underpass light fixture. Three confirmed minor injuries.” 
(Seiff, 2006b) 
SAE 2006-1-0129 includes information about venting directions. This type of failure is 
not only severe, where detonation can result in the complete destruction of the vehicle and death 
of personnel, but it is also the most commonly cited mode of failure in Seiff’s documentation 
(Seiff, 2006b).  
A check valve can freeze due to cold weather or during refueling with wet gas due to the 
Joule-Thompson effect as is documented in a few incidents by Seiff (Seiff, 2006b). For the 
system to operate normally, at least one check valve is located in the fill receptacle component 
leading to the high pressure solenoid valve bypass line to allow refueling to take place while the 
system is shut off and the solenoid valves are closed. If there are several tanks, there may be 
additional check valves (Orion, 2006; WMATA, 2006; Toyota, 2006). If there is only one check 
valve in the system and it freezes while refueling takes place there is a good chance that gas will 
be expelled when the operator removes the refueling nozzle from the fill receptacle while the 
operator is present. The pressure could expel the nozzle with a high force when it is disengaged 
from the fill receptacle injuring the operator. The possible ignition of this gas could burn the 
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operator and thus has very severe consequences. If the system employs multiple check valves 
two possible scenarios could occur. If the check valve at the fill receptacle is independently 
frozen, the system will vent gas through the receptacle as soon as it is started, which is when the 
high pressure solenoids are opened. In the other case if one of the check valves on the bypass 
line is frozen but the receptacle check valve is not, then the high pressure lines will remain 
pressurized even when the system is shut off, creating a high pressure flammable gas hazard if 
the pipes are opened for maintenance. 
Two similar modes of failure affect the fill receptacle. Deformation from physical 
damage and seal embrittlement from wear over time can both result in a high pressure flammable 
gas leakage at the fill receptacle during refueling in the presence of the operator. Because 
refueling requires the presence of the operator, they will most likely be in the presence of the fuel 
leak. However, the operator must visually guide the part of the nozzle to the receptacle and is 
therefore reasonably expected to spot the damage. For this reason it is less likely the failure will 
occur than with the previously mentioned check valve since the freezing may not be visually 
apparent and procedures to avoid check valve failure are not intuitive. 
In most CNG vehicles, PRDs soften at a certain temperature to vent fuel and prevent 
pressure build up. PRDs can fail to activate if they are damaged, e.g., by impact. PRDs can fail to 
activate before the tank ruptures. Deformation is even more likely to cause PRDs to deploy 
prematurely in the presence of an otherwise small fire or frictional heat in a collision. 
Additionally ice damage is noted as a common reason PRDs vent when they should not 
(Dimmick, 2006).  
A PRD may not activate because there is no redundant safety system provided to support 
the PRD. It is possible that deformation could cause the relief line leading to the PRD to be too 
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constricted to relieve the pressure adequately, which would raise the severity of this scenario to 
the same level as for the overpressure state of the storage tank. 
In a compressed gas vehicle PRDs are designed only to sense temperature at a single 
location for each PRD. For this reason a localized flame, for example, caused by the ignition of a 
leak in the high pressure fuel line on a part of the tank not occupied by a PRD can weaken the 
tank so that the rupture occurs. In addition, the flame could also raise the temperature and 
therefore the pressure inside the tank beyond the maximum limits of the tank. This mode of 
failure can result in explosion or flammable leakage from the tank in the presence of an ignition 
source. This specific mode of failure requires the PRD safety devices to not activate due to the 
location of the flames, and for any other redundant safety device to also fail to detect and deal 
with the flame.  
3.2.3 Hydrogen Fuel Cell 
Hydrogen is easier to ignite than CNG. For this reason, the rating of the severity and 
probability are higher. The description of the cause and effects of such a failure remain the same 
as described earlier for CNG. Because hydrogen flames can be invisible, detection is more 
difficult than for ignited flames from a CNG tank, further contributing to the higher RPN. 
Many hydrogen vehicles, such as the Toyota Highlander, (Toyota, 2006) are designed to 
protect both their AC and DC high voltage cables with a GFI monitoring system, which 
automatically shuts off the current. However, other hydrogen vehicles do not have such systems 
and it is not required by vehicle regulations. In the case of a breach of the cable’s protective 
coating without GFI protection, arcing due to high voltage may occur. It is known that arcing can 
occur through the air as well as through water. The additional possible methods of arcing 
increase the probability of failure beyond the probability of arcing through air alone. As stated 
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before from emergency response manuals and expert interviews, the probability of such 
occurrences is still expected to be low. 
The PRD for the hydrogen vehicle works in the same way as the PRD in the CNG 
vehicle, activating in the presence of flame. The presence of a flame is part of the device’s 
normal operating procedure, since a hazardous scenario being present is how the device 
activates. The PRDs venting under normal conditions is assured to vent away from critical zones 
where it could cause damage or injury since it is operating within its design parameters. Still, the 
damage incurred by this component’s operation may be moderate and if left unattended could 
result in damage spreading to other components if they are not cooled. It is highly probable that 
the component’s operation will cause damage. However this damage is relatively small 
compared to the rupture that could occur if the tank were allowed to remain pressurized while 
exposed to weakening conditions. 
Cracking in the high pressure gas line can leak high pressure flammable gas. This 
scenario is most likely to occur in a collision. Since the size of the line is smaller than the tank, 
the maximum possible rupture will be smaller than the maximum possible from the tank and thus 
the fire severity is lower. The lines are relatively unprotected in the event of a collision and if 
other safety components such as the solenoid valves do not isolate the breached line from the 
tank, the entire contents of the tank could vent. There is also the chance that the gas will not 
ignite when initially released and will accumulate and form an explosive mixture. Because this 
mode of failure requires the failure of additional safety devices in the system, it has a lower 
probability than a system without such safety precautions. 
When exposed to a localized flame, breaching of the low pressure tank outlet lines could 
occur without activating temperature sensors, which would isolate the lines from the tank and 
 22
other components. A localized flame of hydrogen leaking from another component would have 
an adiabatic flame temperature of 2384 K in air; (The Engineering Tool Box, 2005) stainless 
steel’s melting temperature is 1693 K (H. Cross Company, 2005). Pressure in these systems is 
monitored, (Toyota, 2006) so after a short time other leak preventative measures may respond to 
the hazard. In addition, the close proximity of this component to other components, which are 
easily affected by the failure and able to cause a localized flame in the engine compartment, 
raises its RPN. 
3.3 FMEA Future Research 
Several issues have arisen during the development of the FMEA that warrant further 
research. These issues are summarized as follows: 
• Improving the safety of each component to improve the design would lower the present 
risk ratings. Future improvements will need to be reevaluated to be accurately assessed. 
• Additional work on FMEA analyses of emerging fuel vehicles is warranted. This work 
could include developing FMEAs for fuel systems other than the three presented here and 
could consider specific designs and components of the systems included here. The 
analyses included here need to be validated with known statistics of vehicle fires and 
component failures for further accuracy. 
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Chapter 4: Quantitative Risk Assessment 
While the FMEA presented in Chapter 3 helps identify and rank specific fire hazards for 
each vehicle type, it is not well suited to comparing the overall fire hazards or risks of these 
vehicle types. Thus a quantitative risk assessment is presented here for the vehicle types of 
Chapter 3: traditional, Gasoline-Electric Hybrid, CNG, and Hydrogen Fuel-Cell. 
This assessment begins with detailed fire statistics for traditional vehicles in the U.S.. For 
each of the other vehicle types, the assessment then estimates multipliers on each fire cause 
frequency, each area of origin probability, and each probability of death. These multipliers are 
estimated using engineering judgment of the hazard identification and the results of knowledge 
gained from the FMEA analysis.  
Applying these multipliers to existing statistics for traditional vehicles yields estimates of 
the numbers of fire deaths per vehicle per year for each vehicle type. The results are also 
generalized to obtain a plot of the variation in fire deaths associated with variations in the 
individual multipliers. 
The quantitative risk assessment method applied in this analysis of EFVs follows a structure 
similar to a risk assessment of CNG Buses by Chamberlain and Modarres (2005). Their analysis 
differs in several ways from the ones performed for this research, primarily in how statistics are 
acquired and used. The overall structure remains the same where quantitative values are 
calculated for the probability and consequence of a scenario occurring to find the overall risk for 
a particular vehicle type. The analysis provides valuable information and a method for 
comparing the risk of one type of vehicle fleet to another with quantitative values as well as 
several other conclusions. This section first describes the overall risk calculation process and 
 24
then presents the statistical source used to find each value, which was put into the 
aforementioned calculation. 
4.1 Traditional Fuel Vehicles 













Fuel 1 0.01 9.95E-6 1 5.26E-3 5.24E-8
Other - 0.99 8.33E-4 1 1.89E-4 1.57E-7
Fuel 1 0.03 7.85E-6 1 2.67E-2 2.09E-7
Other - 0.97 2.64E-4 1 3.97E-3 1.05E-6
Fuel 1 0.01 3.14E-6 1 0 0
Other - 0.99 2.14E-4 1 7.35E-4 1.57E-7
Fuel 1 0.02 1.05E-6 1 5.00E-2 5.24E-8
Other - 0.98 5.97E-5 1 2.63E-3 1.57E-7














Totals for the fleet result in 2.66E+5 fires/year and 350 deaths/year for a fleet of 1.91E+8 vehicles 













Table 4.1 is a quantitative risk assessment for traditional fuel vehicle fire deaths. All 
entries in this table are statistics from Ahrens (2005b) and pertain to fire deaths in 2001. A 
sample equation and calculation for the first line of Table 4.1 is shown below: 
A sample equation for the failure of equipment or heat source with the fire originating in 
the fuel tank or fuel line area for a traditional fuel vehicle is shown below: 
(Cause Mult.)(Cause Freq.)(Origin Mult.)(Origin Prob.)(Conseq. Mult.)(Conseq.) = Risk 
(1)(8.43e-4 [fires/vehicle/year])(1)(0.01)(1)(5.25e-3 [deaths/fire])=5.24e-8 [deaths/vehicle/year] 
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OR 
(Scenario Freq.)(Consequence) = Risk 
(9.95e-6 [fires/vehicle/year])(5.25e-3 [deaths/fire]) = 5.24e-8 [deaths/vehicle/year] 
The statistics used to calculate the Cause Frequency, Origin Probability, and 
Consequence column values of Table 4.1 are reproduced in Table 4.2 for reference. Nearly all 
highway vehicle incidents in 2001 involved gasoline and diesel fueled non-hybrid engine 
systems. 
Table 4.2. Statistics used for risk calculations 
Origin Cause Fires Deaths
Consequence, 
Deaths/Fire
Failure of Equipment 161000 40 2.48E-4
Unintentional 51900 240 4.62E-3
Intentional 41400 30 7.25E-4
Unclassified 11600 40 3.45E-3
Failure of Equipment 1900 10 5.26E-3
Unintentional 1500 40 2.67E-2
Intentional 600 0 0
Unclassified 200 10 5.00E-2
Failure of Equipment 159100 30 1.89E-4
Unintentional 50400 200 3.97E-3
Intentional 40800 30 7.35E-4
Unclassified 11400 30 2.63E-3







The first three columns in Table 4.1 pertain to fire cause. These causes are divided into 
the four main categories of Ahrens (2005b): failure of equipment or heat source; unintentional; 
intentional; or other known or unclassified. Failure of equipment or heat source generally refers 
to the breakage of components through wear. Unintentional failures are failures resulting from a 
collision event. Intentional failures refer to cases of arson. Lastly unclassified or other known 
causes of failure are determined to be the remainder of events where the cause does not fall into 
one of the previously classified categories.  
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The cause multipliers (and all other multipliers) for traditional fuel vehicles are unity by 
definition. These multipliers will be adjusted below for other fuel system types to assess fire 
death risks. 
The fire cause frequencies in Table 4.1 are from Ahrens (2005b). In total these show that 
there were 1.39E-3 fires per vehicle in 2001. 
Two areas of origin are considered in Table 4.1: fuel and other. The fuel area is defined 
as being in the area of the fuel tank or fuel line components. 
The probability of fire originating in the fuel area is low, with a range of 0.01 – 0.03 
depending on fire cause. For each cause the origin probabilities have a sum of unity. These origin 
probabilities were assigned by dividing the number of fires originating in the fuel area due to a 
particular cause by the total number of fires (All Areas) due to that same cause. 
The difference of the probability of fire origin in the fuel area from unity determines the 
fraction of fires that originate in other areas of the vehicle. Other areas refer specifically to the 
engine, running gear, wheel, operator, passenger, and trunk areas of the vehicle. 
The scenario frequencies were determined by multiplying the cause frequency by the 
origin probability. 
The fire consequence values were obtained from Ahrens (2005b) by dividing the number 
of deaths per year by the number of fires for each cause-origin scenario possibility. 
Finally, the risk of fire death was obtained by multiplying the scenario frequency by the 
consequence. The sum of this risk for all causes and areas of origin was 1.83E-6 fire deaths per 
vehicle in 2001. 
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The 2001 U.S. highway vehicle fleet consisted of 191 million vehicles. When this 
number is multiplied by the total cause frequency and the risk, respectively, the results are 
266,000 vehicle fires and 350 vehicle fire deaths in 2001.  
4.2 Gasoline-Electric Hybrid Vehicles 
A demonstration of how the multiplier is inserted into the fire death risk calculation for 
hybrid vehicles is shown in Table 4.3. 













Fuel 1 0.01 1.24E-5 1 5.26E-3 6.54E-8
Other - 0.99 1.04E-3 1 1.89E-4 1.96E-7
Fuel 1 0.03 9.82E-6 1 2.67E-2 2.62E-7
Other - 0.97 3.30E-4 1 3.97E-3 1.31E-6
Fuel 1 0.01 3.14E-6 1 0 0
Other - 0.99 2.14E-4 1 7.35E-4 1.57E-7
Fuel 1 0.02 1.05E-6 1 5.00E-2 5.24E-8
Other - 0.98 5.97E-5 1 2.63E-3 1.57E-7















Totals for the fleet result in 3.19E+5 fires/year and 420 deaths/year for a fleet of 1.91E+8 vehicles 
(EIA, 2005) and therefore an average of 1.32E-3 deaths per fire.







For gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles the electrical system is the main difference 
compared to a traditional fuel vehicle. The system involves many more complex components and 
high-voltage power. These fire hazards lead to an increased probability that a fire will occur; 
therefore the Cause Multiplier was increased from 1 to 1.25. For hybrid vehicles, the hazards are 
not likely to involve the fuel system more often, develop significantly faster, or with greater 
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intensity than for traditional fuel vehicles. Therefore it is determined that for hybrid vehicle fire 
scenarios that are not related to the different electrical system, such as intentional scenarios, all 
other multipliers should remain the same.  
The prediction is that 420 deaths per year are predicted based on a fleet size of 191 
million vehicles. This is an increase by a factor of 1.2 from traditional fuel vehicles. 
 
4.3 Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles  
A demonstration of how the multipliers are applied in the fire risk calculation for CNG 
vehicles is shown in Table 4.4 below. 
 













Fuel 1.5 0.02 2.24E-5 4 2.11E-2 4.71E-7
Other - 0.98 1.24E-3 1 1.89E-4 2.34E-7
Fuel 1.5 0.04 1.77E-5 4 1.07E-1 1.88E-6
Other - 0.96 3.90E-4 1 3.97E-3 1.55E-6
Fuel 1.5 0.02 4.71E-6 4 0 0
Other - 0.98 2.12E-4 1 7.35E-4 1.56E-7
Fuel 1.5 0.03 1.57E-6 4 2.00E-1 3.14E-7
Other - 0.97 5.92E-5 1 2.63E-3 1.56E-7















Totals for the fleet result in 3.72E+5 fires/year and 910 deaths/year for a fleet of 1.91E+8 vehicles 
(EIA, 2005) and therefore an average of 2.44E-3 deaths per fire.








For CNG vehicles the fuel system involves a high pressure gas storage and delivery 
system and this is the most significant factor in changing the risk for this vehicle. Given the 
higher vulnerability of a compressed fuel system due to wider flammability limits, having a 
greater number of components, and the PRD activation features of CNG vehicles it is more likely 
that fire scenarios will occur due to failure of equipment or heat sources and unintentional 
causes. For these aforementioned reasons the Cause Multiplier for CNG is increased by 0.5 
giving it a total of 1.5. 
Fires will originate in the fuel line or storage tank area of the vehicle more often for the 
same reason as the Cause Multiplier’s increase. The value of the Origin Multiplier’s increase is 
therefore the same as the Cause Multiplier’s. The Origin Multiplier therefore is increased by 0.5 
for a total of 1.5. 
 The consequence of fuel originating fire scenarios is increased due to natural gas’s ability 
to produce a jet flame fire scenario or explosive fire scenario when the fuel is involved. An 
explosion scenario has the ability to affect a greater number of people than simply those carried 
by the vehicle itself including emergency responders inside the exclusion zone. A previous 
quantitative risk assessment of CNG buses took these hazards into account and gave an estimated 
value of consequence (Chamberlain and Modarres, 2005) that was considered when choosing the 
Consequence Multiplier in this analysis. Buses have a greater number of passengers, larger fuel 
storage, and different egress measures than passenger vehicles and thus have a higher 
consequence value. For this reason the Consequence Multiplier determined using the previous 
analysis was decreased to better represent the consequence of an entire CNG vehicle fleet. Thus 
the Consequence Multiplier was set to 4 in the current CNG vehicle analysis. 
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The result is that 910 deaths per year are predicted based on a fleet size of 191 million 
vehicles. This is an increase by a factor of 2.6 from traditional fuel vehicles. 
4.4 Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles  
A demonstration of how the multiplier is applied in the fire risk calculation for Hydrogen 
vehicles is shown in Table 4.5 below. 













Fuel 1.6 0.02 2.94E-5 5 2.63E-2 7.75E-7
Other - 0.98 1.53E-3 1 1.89E-4 2.88E-7
Fuel 1.6 0.05 2.32E-5 5 1.33E-1 3.10E-6
Other - 0.95 4.79E-4 1 3.97E-3 1.90E-6
Fuel 1.6 0.02 5.03E-6 5 0 0
Other - 0.98 2.12E-4 1 7.35E-4 1.56E-7
Fuel 1.6 0.03 1.68E-6 5 2.50E-1 4.19E-7
Other - 0.97 5.91E-5 1 2.63E-3 1.55E-7















Totals for the fleet result in 4.47E+5 fires/year and 1298 deaths/year for a fleet of 1.91E+8 vehicles 
(EIA, 2005) and therefore an average of 2.9E-3 deaths per fire.







Hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles, as mentioned earlier, have the hazards of a gasoline-electric 
hybrid vehicle and a CNG vehicle as well as several other unique hazards. As a result the Cause 
Multiplier of hydrogen vehicles is increased 0.25 above traditional fuel scenarios due to having a 
similar electric system of the hybrid vehicles. The Cause Multiplier is increased an additional 0.5 
due to having a compressed fuel system that is similar to the CNG vehicles as well. Furthermore, 
since hydrogen has wider flammability limits and a higher leakage propensity the Cause 
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Multiplier is increased a further 0.10. The total Cause Multiplier for hydrogen is thus estimated 
at 1.85.  
The Origin Multiplier for hydrogen is estimated at 1.6, a 0.6 increase from traditional 
fuel.  Since hydrogen fuel cell vehicles have similar fuel transfer and storage components as 
CNG they have the same 0.5 increase in this multiplier. The further 0.1 increase to this multiplier 
is due to hydrogen having wider flammability limits and a higher leakage propensity than CNG. 
The Consequence Multiplier for hydrogen vehicles is 5. This value was chosen relative to 
the chosen multiplier of CNG vehicles. The reason hydrogen has a higher multiplier value comes 
from hydrogen’s low visibility flame and wider flammability limits. Since hydrogen flames are 
more difficult to detect it is likely that a greater number of people will enter a flame they would 
have avoided if it had been visually and radiantly more apparent.  
The prediction is that 1298 deaths per year are predicted based on a fleet size of 191 
million vehicles. This is an increase by a factor of 3.7 from traditional fuel vehicles.  































Figure 4.1. Predicted risk values by fuel type. 
 
4.5 Sources of Error 
There a number of sources of possible error that could affect the risk analysis. These 
errors may explain differences between the predicted risk and future statistics. The errors are 
enumerated as follows: 
• Statistical Error 
• Unprecedented or Unpredicted Vulnerability (Chain events…) 
• Design Changes (Component protection, component configuration…) 
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4.5.1 Statistical Error 
The Ahrens’s statistics being used may be too dated to effectively represent changes that 
have been made in safety design and regulation in the last eight years or by the time a particular 
EFV dominates the vehicle fleet population. Currently there is a full variety in the age of 
vehicles on the road, and not all comply with current safety regulations. Assuming most of the 
EFV fleet being analyzed will be built in the future under the effect of these changes in design 
and regulation the overall risk could be different. Furthermore not all fire related deaths are 
reported or reported correctly (Wenske, 2006; Ahrens 2005a; Parsons, 1990).  
Ahrens’s statistics were taken between 1999 and 2001 (Ahrens, 2005b) and will likely 
not match the current vehicle situation. The number of vehicles on the road has increased each 
year up to the present time. This will change the risk calculated in units of deaths per year, but 
will not affect the risk calculated as the number of deaths per year per vehicle. Also the 
percentage of emerging fuel vehicles has also increased since the statistics were acquired. This 
change can affect the risk in both terms of both unit calculations. At this time there is no valid 
way to separate emerging fuel vehicles from the current vehicle data. However, because the 
percentage at this time is small, less than one percent (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008), this is not 
believed to have a significant effect on the result for traditional fuel risk. 
A fire scenario that involves more than one vehicle can be statistically complicated. If 
two or more vehicles are involved in a fire scenario, they will be considered to be two separate 
scenarios in statistical reporting. Such an occurrence was not relevantly possible for traditional 
fuel scenarios and so the complicated effects it creates were not considered until the EFV 
analysis was performed. The effect of the new possibility of “chain scenarios” raises the 
probability of “Unintentional” fire scenarios for that type of vehicle fleet. The prediction of this 
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requires accurate knowledge of fire scenario exclusion zones, average vehicle density, and is 
highly variable depending on vehicle configuration. The complexity of predicting such 
occurrences is beyond the scope of the statistics used in this thesis and cannot be predicted with 
reliable accuracy. 
4.5.2 Unprecedented or Unpredicted Vulnerability 
Much of safety design and regulation depends on prior experience. Without such 
experience it is difficult to predict the risk of scenarios that have never occurred before. Due to 
the large scale of some interesting high risk scenarios it is costly to do full scale testing to 
provide a better prediction. Two such large scale scenarios are a scenario where a jet flame from 
a PRD impinges on a fuel tanker in rush-hour type traffic and a scenario where a compressed gas 
fuel tank explosion occurs in an urban environment with surrounding high-rise structures. 
4.5.3 Design Changes 
Risk depends heavily on the explicit design choices made to construct a certain vehicle 
type, such as component choice and layout. In the current EFVs some compressed fuel systems 
do not have PRDs and some high voltage hybrid systems do not employ GFIs, however others 
do. Placement of the fuel tank or PRD on the roof or underside of a vehicle can also have an 
effect on how or whether a fire scenario occurs in a given circumstance. Which design 
configurations dominate future EFV production will change whether, how, and why certain fire 
scenarios may occur.  
4.6 Uncertainty Analysis 
Risk multipliers were chosen based on the knowledge gained from the prior research 
discussed in this thesis. For illustrative purposes are estimated to have an error of 20% or less. 
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For two of the EFV risk analyses several attributes are multiplied simultaneously and so the 














































The resulting uncertainty value is added and subtracted from the predicted risk values to 
determine the maximum and minimum values of fire death risk, otherwise referred to as the risk 
error margin.  
The variables used to calculate the value of each fuel type’s uncertainty are shown in 
Table 4.6 below. In the table no multiplier was applied to the traditional fuel and so its 
uncertainty is assumed to be zero. This assumption is supported by the fact that this value is 
based on reported vehicle statistics of that year (Ahrens, 2005b) even though the statistics in 
Table 4.2 are estimated. For ease of comparison between vehicles the maximum and minimum 
risk values are graphed in Figure 4.2 based on the calculated uncertainty values.  
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Table 4.6. Predicted range of risk values by fuel type 
Fuel Δv1 Δv2 Δv3 δv1 δv2 δv3 Predicted Risk ΔR δR Max Risk Min Risk Actual
Traditional 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 -350 0 0 0 350
Hybrid 0.25 0 0 0.05 0 0 420 70 14 434 406 0
CNG 0.5 0.5 3 0.1 0.1 0.6 910 560 336 1246 574 0
Hydrogen 0.85 0.6 4 0.17 0.12 0.8 1298 948 569 1867 729 0
Note: if Δvi = Δvi,gasoline, δvi = 0
          if δvi = 20% * Δvi, δvi = 0
          else Δvi ≠ Δvi,gasoline, δvi = 0.2 vi  
Where for each vehicle type: 
Δv1= Cause Multiplier – 1.0 
Δv2= Origin Multiplier – 1.0 
Δv3= Consequence Multiplier – 1.0 
ΔR= Total Risk – 350 [deaths/year] 
Min. Risk = Risk – δR 



















































Figure 4.2. Risk with uncertainty values by fuel type. 
The “Traditional” value is taken from Ahrens, 2001 statistics. Other values are calculated 
from Table 4.6 using the stated risk calculation with the number of vehicles on the road in 
2001. 
In Figure 4.2 above it can be seen that the uncertainty margin from least to greatest is 
Hybrid, CNG, and Hydrogen. The uncertainty calculation takes the size of the multiplier into 
account. Hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles are given the largest multiplier values for all three 
multipliers while gasoline-electric hybrids have the least greatest multiplier for only one 
multiplier. A greater value and number of changes in the multipliers results in a greater amount 
of uncertainty in the final amount of risk. 
From the graph it is apparent that a gasoline-electric hybrid vehicle’s predicted risk, as 
well as its maximum and minimum values, is above that of traditional fuel vehicles but 
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significantly less than that of the other EFVs. Both compressed gas fuels have predicted, 
maximum, and minimum risk significantly above that of either traditional or hybrid vehicles. 
CNG ranged from roughly two times greater to up to four times greater risk than traditional fuel 
vehicles. There is some overlap between the values of CNG and Hydrogen Fuel-Cell risk and 
thus it is predicted that the risk of either vehicle may actually be the same due to error. But 
generally hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles have a higher predicted value and maximum value 
compared to the maximum values of the other vehicle types.  
With future research using additional supporting statistics or experimentation the 
uncertainty of the risk calculation for these fuels can be reduced. If additional safety features or a 
major design change in the future are implemented some multipliers will be reduced or 
eliminated thus reducing the associated error.  
4.7 Multiplier Analysis 
This analysis process provides more than just a calculation method to predict comparable 
quantitative risk values. By independently varying the multipliers of cause frequency, area of 
origin probability, and consequence one can observe the relative impact that each scenario 
dependant multiplier has on the risk. Since there are three multipliers three lines were made on 






















350 Deaths in 2001 for 
Traditional Fuel
 
Figure 4.3. Risk trends due to fire risk multipliers.  
The lines are made by changing one multiplier independently while keeping the other two 
multipliers at 1. If the multipliers are all set to 1, the multiplier values of a traditional fuel 
vehicle, then the number of deaths per year in 2001 is 350. Increasing a multiplier linearly 
increases the number of deaths per year. The slope of each line indicates the effect of changes in 
the multiplier on the estimated deaths per year. 
The slope of the Origin Multiplier and the Consequence Multiplier are relatively the 
same. The Cause Multiplier has a much more significant effect than the other two multipliers, 
roughly 4.67 times greater. This indicates that if vehicle designs and regulations are changed to 
reduce the probability of fires caused by equipment and unintentional failures they will have a 
greater effect of reducing the risk than by changing the other multipliers by the same percentage.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
From the quantitative EFV risk assessment research the following conclusions can be 
made: 
1. Hybrid vehicles provide only a moderately greater fire death risk than traditional fuel 
vehicles, an increase by an estimated factor of 1.2.  
2. Compressed fuel vehicles have a much greater relative risk. CNG vehicles are predicted 
to have a fire death risk that is 2.6 times greater than traditional fuel vehicles. Hydrogen 
fuel-cell vehicles are predicted to have fire death risk that is 3.7 times that of traditional 
fuel vehicles. The larger estimated risk stems largely from failures of high pressure fuel 
tank and fuel line components. Such failures may result in jet and explosion fires. 
Another significant risk contributor is the activation of PRDs creating a jet flame. Though 
PRDs lower the probability of a high risk explosion scenario, their operation still presents 
a greater hazard than those hazards commonly found in traditional fuel vehicles. These 
EFV risk comparison values only apply to current vehicle designs. 
3. The predicted risk uncertainty for the compressed fuel vehicles is much greater than for 
gasoline-electric hybrids. Further consideration through experimentation and simulation 
needs to be given to the fire scenarios associated with these fuels before a truly definitive 
answer can be given with regards to their comparative risk. 
4. Reducing the Cause Multiplier results in the greatest reduction in risk, 4.67 times greater 
than the other two multipliers. To reduce the Cause Multiplier the frequency of fires 
occurring due to failure of equipment and heat sources as well as unintentional failures 
must be reduced. The effectiveness of a solution can be measured by considering whether 
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the solution will simultaneously reduce multiple multipliers, the risk reduction effect of 
the multiplier, and lastly the cost of implementing the solution.   
From this research, opportunities have appeared where future research can aid the qualitative 
EFV risk assessment that were not addressed already during the hazard assessment suggestions 
for future research. These opportunities are as follows: 
1. In future research experimentation and simulation can be done to provide greater 
accuracy. It is recommended that this be done with one vehicle type per set of report. 
This would allow for greater detail, a feasible cost for experimentation, a feasible 
timetable for simulation, multiple reporting on variations of each fuel type’s design, and 
safety features. The broad range of three different fuel types did not allow as much focus 
on scenario development as if only one fuel type is considered per research period.  
2. Use of a panel of experts to decide the values for estimates such as the multiplier values 
would increase the knowledge base used to make such estimates. 
3. Research that applies simulations of egress success according to different fire scenarios 
would provide a much more accurate consequence value in the risk calculation. This 
research would identify what scenarios are most important to prevent due to higher 
predicted consequence. 
4. Research can be done to determine the risk effects of complicated chain reaction event 
scenarios. Hopefully by focusing on one vehicle type at a time it may be feasible to 
address the effects of such complicated scenarios. However, these effects alone may each 
require their own separate research attempt.  
5. Though it is too great of an extrapolation for this research to make, it may be relevant in 
future research to consider that a vehicle fleet entirely composed of compressed fuel type 
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vehicles will require a number of large sized fuel transport vehicles. The hazard of 
employing a large number of these vehicles may not be insignificant. While these 
vehicles currently exist, they are designed with safety margins based on operating in a 
traditional fuel vehicle fleet where explosions and other possible EFV hazards are a 
completely unexpected occurrence. The damage of an ignited flame jet of a PRD applied 
in a collision to a gasoline, natural gas, hydrogen, or other fuel tanker has yet to be 
quantified. Such large transport vehicles may require revised design, procedures, or 
regulations to ensure that during an EFV fire scenario they do not contribute to the 
scenario or otherwise remain outside the exclusion zone. 
6. It would be an important contribution to develop the means to identify EFVs in statistics 
from standard reporting procedures. Using multipliers would then be unnecessary since 
the risk could be calculated directly from the identified statistics. Using future developed 
statistics will provide a more up to date comparison of risk. However, it will be 
increasingly important to separate EFVs from actual traditional fuel vehicles in generic 
statistics in the future since the percentage of these vehicles on the road is increasing and 
may eventually dominate the statistics over traditional fuel vehicles.  
 
These recommendations and discoveries do not seek to warn against producing or developing 
any of the types of EFVs. By providing insight on the relative risks associated with EFVs these 
recommendations and discoveries will hopefully instead help to give all EFV types a chance at a 
viable future in the automotive industry.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Expert Interviews Contact Information 
Table A.1 – Table of Expert Interviews 
 
Last First email phone Occupation Expertise
Akers Bret Bret_M_Akers@rl.gov 509-376-3712
Hydrogen safety - HAMMER 
Training and Education 
Center H2 Safety
Astredo Pat 213-922-5830
LA MTA - Largest US CNG 
fleet CNG buses
Blake Meghan Info@cafcp.org 916-375-8034
Communications Specialist - 
Media - California Fuel Cell 
Partnership Hydrogen Safety
Bush Kevin keberofpe@hotmail.com FPE - MD State FM Office Electrical fires and Non-Crashes
Chernicoff William/Bill william.chernicoff@dot.gov 202-360-6623 DOT
Government funded safety 
studies
Clemens Richard 410-859-7481 BWI airport FD
BWI airport CNG bus fire 
incident, supply hose and vent 
hose for PRD
DeFlavis Richard
BWI airport CNG incident contact 
info
Dickens Jack Jdickens@ci.chula-vista.ca.us Hydrogen Refueling, Trailer
Dimmick John john.dimmick@sbcglobal.net 262-549-1894 NGV2 member NG design standard changes
Flanagan Timothy timothy.flanagan@exeloncorp.com 610-832-6450 Peco Energy - Exelon Crop CNG Delivery systems
Fluer Larry larryfluer@earthlink.net 805-238-7896 H2 Refueling
Fusco Chuck Chuckfusco@aol.com Fire Chief - Berywn Heights Emergency Response
Gambone Livio livio.gambone@powertechlabs.com
Presentation on 
CleanVehicle.org CNG bus Fire incident video
Golden Bob rgolden@wmata.com 301-618-1181
Bus Vehicle Engineer - 
WMATA CNG Buse Fire Hazards
Gromis Adam
California Fuel Cell 
Partnership H2 first responder's guide
Guilmette Aaron 248-728-7000 R. L. Polk and Co. Registered Vehicle Statistics
Halpert Jeff Jhalpert@ci.glendale.ca.us Alum
CNG Bus Fires in Sacramento 
and Palms Springs from the LA 
Area Fire Marshals
Hamilton Jennifer 916-375-4914
Safety Officer - California Fuel 
Cell Partnership Hydrogen Safety  
Haq Kathy khaq@apep.uci.edu
National Fuel Cell Research 
Center Fuel Cell Safety
Hoagland Bill 303-530-1140 Hydrogen 2000 DOE funded H2 Miami research
Holland Geoff h2000@earthlink.net Hydrogen 2000 Hydrogen Safety Video
Jakubowski Greg gregory_jakubowski@merck.com Alum with a PA FD Emergency Response
Joseph Tom josepht@airproducts.com 610-481-8416 Air Products H2 Refueling
Kerber Steve kerb24lgb@aol.com
Assistant Chief - College Park 
FD Emergency Response
Knight Cindy Cindy_Knight@Toyota.com 310-468-2170
Marketing Communications 
PR Manager, Toyota Motor 
Sales, USA, Inc.
Kolly Joseph KollyJ@ntsb.gov NTSB BWI CNG Bus fire report
Korn James jkorn@co.ba.md.us 410-887-4860 Baltimore County FD Emergency Response
Leach Susan sdleach@comcast.net
Executive Director - Hydrogen 
2000 Hydrogen Safety Video
McCoy Danny dmccoy@bhvfd14.org 301-741-8089
Wagon Driver of 10 Engine in 
WDC and Deputy Chief of 




Milliken Andrew amilli@umd.edu, Andrew6512@aol.com Sergeant Emergency Response
Mount Andy Amount@plymouthtownship.org 610-277-4311
Fire Marshal in Plymouth Twp, 
Montgomery County, PA traffic accidents in their area
O'Neill Joe Joneill@uppermoreland.org
Fire Marshal in Upper 
Moreland Twp., Montgomery 
County, PA traffic accidents in their area
Panagiotou Joe panagij@ntsb.gov NTSB BWI CNG Bus fire report
Pehrson Nancy nancy.pehrson@centerpointenergy.com Center Point Energy
NFPA 52 VAF Technical 
Committee
Platt Tom Assistant Fire Marshal Emergency Response
Sawyer Steve ssawyer@nfpa.org 617-984-7423
Senior Fire Service 
Specialist/Executive Secretary 
IFMA - NFPA traffic accidents
Scott Marc mwscott@lacofd.org 909-620-2202
Vehicle Extrication Instructor - 
Los Angeles County FD CNG, Hybrid, H2 experience
Seiff Hank hseiff@cleanvehicle.org 703-534-6151
Director of Technology - 
Clean Vehicle Education 
Foundation
NG incidents and 1st responder 
training
Snyder Bill 3094@bavfc.org Bel Air, MD FD Emergency Response
Stiteler Don don@uprov-montco.org
Fire Marshal in Upper 
Providence Twp., 
Montgomery County, PA traffic accidents in their area
Stuart Lurae lstuart@apta.com 202-496-4844
Senior Program Manager-Bus 
Programs - American Public 
Transportation Association CNG Buse Fire Hazards
Swain Michael mswain@miami.edu
Professor, University of 
Miami, Florida
H2 tests of Gasoline vs. 
Hydrogen fire
Tefft Brian brtefft@aaafoundation.org 202-638-5944 ex
Research Analyst - AAA 
Foundation for Traffic Safety FARS and NASS data
Tucker Elizibeth 202-737-1226
State Fire Marshal's 
Association Electrical fires and Non-Crashes
Wallace Phil pwallace@wmata.com 301-618-1097
Head of Bus Maintenance - 
WMATA CNG Buse Fire Hazards
Welsh Fred fhwelsh@att.net 240-777-2477
CFPS, EFO, Fire Chief - 
College Park Emergency Response
Winston Emily ebwinston@ucdavis.edu Hydrogen Refueling
Wolff Ossana owolff@umd.edu CNG Buse Fire Hazards
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Appendix B - Vehicle Layout 
 








Figure B.3 - Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicle, in Color (Toyota, 2006) 
Reproduced with permission from Toyota Motor Corporation, April 21, 2008.
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Figure B.4 - Hybrid Vehicle (Toyota, 2006) 
Used with permission from Toyota Motor Corporation, April 21, 2008. 
 
Table B.1 – Hybrid Vehicle Component Summary (Toyota, 2006) 




Appendix C – Table of Supporting Emergency Response Guides 

































































Toyota EFV Emergency 
Response Guide (ERG) http://techinfo.toyota.com/
RFA E85 Guides, Specs, and 
Procedures http://www.ethanolrfa.org/objects/pdf/MemberDocuments/RFA_IndustryGuidelines.pdf





CaFCP - H2 ERG Video http://www.cafcp.org/resource-
ctr_ermaterials.htm#er_video
NHTSA - DOT - Approaching 
AFV Crashes (1996) http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/enforce/pub/altfuel.pdf




Risk…LPG Tanks Hassan - SAE 2006-01-1274
GM Service Technical 
College
Hybrid Truck Emergency Personnel Training 
(2004)
B. Gustin, New fire tactics for 
new-car fires Fire Engineering 149:43 (1996)
PECO Energy ERG for Emergencies Involving Electricity 
and Gas




Texas State Safety manual 
Section 16 Vehicle Safety
http://www.vpfss.txstate.edu/riskmgt/Assets/1
6-VehicleSafety.pdf
AFV Transit in Florida http://www.clean-cities.org/pdf/afvguide.pdf




NYSERDA Garage Guidelines for Alternative Fuels 
(1996)
DOE - Hydrogen Safety http://www1.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfue
lcells/pdfs/doe_h2_safety.pdf




Appendix D - FMEA 
Table D.1 - FMEA Hybrid, arranged by components. 
Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (Design FMEA)           

























(HV) Battery Pack 
Stores High Voltage 
Electricity 
Electrical Short Arcing, electrifies other 
components with high voltage and 
possible ignition source. 
9 Short Circuit 4 36 
  Cracking Corrosive liquid leakage, toxic fire 
hazard, loss of power to electric 





    Corrosion Loss of power to electric motor, 









Electrical Short Arcing, electrifies other 
components with high voltage and 





Corrosion Arcing, electrifies other 
components with high voltage and 




    Cracking Arcing, electrifies other 
components with high voltage and 
















    
Electrical Short Loss of power to vehicle and 
system components. 
1 Short Circuit 4 4 
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Fuel Tank (And 
fuel lines) 
Holds Gasoline Fuel 
(and Carries Fuel to 
Engine) 





Deformation Prevents fuel flow 2 Excessive 
loading 
5 10 
  Corrosion Flammable leakage 6 Improper 
maintenance 
1 6 




Voltage and Fuel in 
Collision 
Electrical Open No high voltage shutoff in 




  Electrical Short Loss of power 1 Short Circuit 3 3 
    Deformation Loss of power to vehicle 1 Improper 
maintenance 
7 7 
Gasoline Engine Powers Vehicle and 
Generator to Recharge 
HV Battery. 
Corrosion Rupture, flammable leakage. 6 Improper 
maintenance 
5 30 
  Deformation Damage to engine, loss of power 




  Contamination Prevents fuel flow 5 Dirty Fuel 5 25 
    Torque Fatigue Mechanical Failure 5 Excessive 
loading 
5 25 
Electric Motor Powers Vehicle. Torque Fatigue High force mechanical failure 6 Excessive 
loading 
5 30 
  Electrical Short Arcing, electrifies other 
components with high voltage and 
possible ignition source. 
8 Short Circuit 3 24 
  Cracking Arcing, electrifies other 
components with high voltage and 





    Deformation Loss of power to vehicle 5 Improper 
maintenance 
3 15 
Inverter/Converter Boosts and Inverts 
Power to and from AC 
and DC.   





Monitors and Prevents 
Exposure to High 
Voltage Wiring. 






Electrical Short Loss of power to vehicle and 
system components. 
2 Short Circuit 8 16 






Electric Generator Charges HV Battery 
Pack 
Torque Fatigue Failure to charge HV battery pack, 





  Deformation Failure to charge HV battery pack, 









12 volt DC-DC 
Converter 
Steps Down High 
Voltage to Low Voltage 
for System 
Components 
Deformation Failure to step down voltage 6 Excessive 
loading 
3 18 
  Cracking Failure to step down voltage, 





    Electrical Short Failure to step down voltage 6 Short Circuit 2 12 
12 Volt Auxiliary 
Battery 
Powers Low Voltage 
Devices 
Cracking Corrosive liquid leakage, loss of 






Electrical Short Loss of power to low voltage 
electrical equipment 
1 Short Circuit 5 5 






Table D.2 - FMEA CNG, arranged by components. 
 55
Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (Design FMEA)           
Component ID: 
CNG               
Component Name Function 
Potential 
Failure 




















Storage Tank Stores gas. Over-
Pressure 






  Localized 
Flame 
Rupture, Flammable Leakage 9 Fuel line 
failure 
5 45 
  Corrosion Rupture, Flammable Leakage 7 Exposure to 
acid 
5 35 
    Deformation Rupture, Flammable Leakage 7 Excessive 
loading 
5 35 
Check Valve Allows fuel to flow to the 
cylinders during fuelling 
(bypassing the high 
pressure solenoids) and 
close when fuelling is 
complete. 
Freezing Prevents isolation, high pressure 
flammable back flow at the fill 
receptacle 





    Deformation Prevents isolation, high pressure 





Fill Receptacle Receives fuel from pump. Deformation Flammable leakage of high 




  Seal 
Embrittlement
Flammable leakage of high 












Vents pressure in the tank 
when exposed to 
temperatures between 
212°F. and 250°F 









Failure to operate, Tank over-
pressure 
8 Fuel line 
failure 
3 24 
  Blockage Explosion in tank 10 Dirty fuel 2 20 
    Localized 
Flame near 
component 
Premature operation, Flammable 
leakage 




Valve on Fueling 
Manifold 
Isolates the fill receptacle 
from the storage cylinders 
in case the check valves 
fail. 






    Freezing Prevents isolation of flammable 
leakage 












Damaged components leak 
flammable gas. 
6 Puncture of 
hood or door 
6 36 
    
Electrical 
Short 
Prevents isolation, high pressure 







Transmits fuel through 
system 
Corrosion Rupture, Flammable Leakage 7 Exposure to 
acid 
5 35 













Tube Fittings Seals connection of fuel 
lines to components. 
Torque 
Fatigue 




  Corrosion Rupture, Flammable Leakage 6 Exposure to 
acid 
5 30 





Transmits fuel through 
system 
Corrosion Rupture, Flammable Leakage 6 Exposure to 
acid 
5 30 







Rupture, Flammable Leakage 6 Regulator 
deformation 
2 12 





Provides fuel isolation for 
the tank when the vehicle 
is shut off, or upon 
activation of the safety 
system. 
Deformation Prevents isolation, high pressure 





  Internal 
Corrosion 
Prevents isolation during system 
shutdown 
7 Dirty fuel 4 28 
  External 
Corrosion 
Rupture, Flammable Leakage 6 Exposure to 
acid or salt 
2 12 
    
Electrical 
Short 
Premature isolation, Prevents fuel 
flow 
1 Wire failure 5 5 
Pressure 
Regulator 
Drops pressure in the fuel 
line from the storage 
pressure to the pressure 
required for the engine 
(~120PSI) 





    






Valve on Tank 
Isolates each individual 
cylinder manually. 
Corrosion Flammable leakage, Prevents 
isolation 




Deformation Prevents isolation 4 Excessive 
loading 
5 20 






Isolates the fuel injectors 
from the low pressure fuel 
lines 
Deformation Prevents isolation  5 Excessive 
loading 
5 25 
  Internal 
Corrosion 
Prevents isolation during system 
shutdown 
5 Dirty fuel 3 15 
  External 
Corrosion 
Rupture, Flammable Leakage 6 Exposure to 
acid 
2 12 
    Electrical 
Short 
Premature isolation, Prevents fuel 
flow 
1 Wire failure 5 5 
Fuel Heater Heats the fuel. Cracking Rupture, Cold fuel clogs and 





    Corrosion Rupture, Cold fuel clogs and 
damages components in further 
processes 





Filters fuel. Internal 
Corrosion 
Unfiltered fuel, further component 
damage in further processes 
2 Dirty fuel 9 18 
  Excess 
Moisture 
Unfiltered fuel, further component 
damage in further processes 




  External 
Corrosion 
Rupture, Flammable Leakage 4 Exposure to 
acid 
3 12 
    Clogging Prevents fuel flow 1 Dirty fuel 8 8 
Low Pressure 
Fuel Filter 
Filters fuel. Internal 
Corrosion 
Unfiltered fuel, further component 
damage in further processes 
2 Dirty fuel 8 16 
  Excess 
Moisture 
Unfiltered fuel, further component 
damage in further processes 





  External 
Corrosion 
Rupture, Flammable Leakage 4 Exposure to 
acid 
3 12 
    Clogging Prevents fuel flow 1 Dirty fuel 6 6 
Fuel Injector Injects fuel into the 
engine. 
Cracking Rupture, Flammable Leakage 3 Excessive 
loading 
5 15 
  Deformation Prevents fuel flow 1 Excessive 
loading 
6 6 
    Clogging Prevents fuel flow 1 Dirty fuel 3 3 
High Pressure 
Gauge 
Measures the pressure in 
the high pressure fuel 
lines. 









    






Measures the pressure in 
the low pressure fuel lines 




Faulty measurement 4 Regulator 
deformation 
2 8 
  Deformation Faulty measurement 2 Excessive 
loading 
3 6 





Table D.3 - FMEA Hydrogen Fuel Cell, arranged by components. 
Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (Design FMEA)           
Component ID: 





























Carries high voltage DC 
between the PCU and the 












Carries 3 phase AC 
between PCU and 
components in the motor 
compartment along with 
the hydrogen pump. 
Electrical 
Short 








Leaks high pressure flammable 





  Localized 
flame 
Leaks large volume of high 
pressure flammable gas. 
8 Small flame 6 48 
  
Deformation Compresses tank to over-
pressure situation and lowers 




  Cracking Leaks large volume of high 




    Corrosion Leaks large volume of high 
pressure flammable gas. 





Fusible temperature plug 
that quickly vents the tank 
if the plug exceeds 230°F 
(110°C). 
Flame Leaks large volume of high 
pressure flammable gas in 
presence of ignition source. 
6 Flame 9 54 
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  Deformation Clogs and allows tank to 





  Clogging Allows tank to overheat and 
exceed burst pressure. 
10 Dirty fuel 3 30 
  Cracking Premature fuel release. 5 Excessive 
loading 
5 25 




Tank Inlet Lines 
Transports high pressure 
H2 from the filler to the fuel 
tank. 





  Localized 
flame 
Leaks high pressure flammable 
gas in presence of ignition 
source. 
8 Small flame 6 48 
  Over-
Pressure 






  Corrosion Leaks high pressure flammable 
gas. 
7 exposure to 
acid 
4 28 




Tank Outlet Lines 
Transports lower pressure 




Leaks low pressure flammable 
gas in presence of ignition 
source. 
7 Small flame 7 49 





  Corrosion Leaks low pressure flammable 
gas. 

















Measures temperature at 
the H2 tank and 




Does not signal ECU system 
shutdown in presence of 
overheating and weakening of 
components lowering their burst 
pressure in presence of ignition 
source. 




  Miscalibration Does not signal ECU system 
shutdown in presence of 
hazardous situation, allows over 




    Electrical 
Short 





Check Valve Ensures one way flow of 
fuel at the H2 filler, each 
tank and at locations in the 
distribution lines. 
Freezing Does not shut down fuel flow, 
allowing high pressure 




  Deformation Does not shut down fuel flow, 
allowing high pressure 















Leaks high pressure flammable 
gas. 
7 Wear 6 42 
  










Pressure Sensors Detects abnormal pressure 





Does not signal ECU system 
shutdown in presence of 
overheating and weakening of 
components lowering their burst 
pressure in presence of ignition 
source. 
8 Small flame 5 40 
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  Miscalibration Does not signal ECU system 
shutdown in presence of 
overheating and weakening of 






    
Electrical 
Short 





Impact Sensors Sense a predetermined 




Does not signal ECU system 





    Electrical 
Short 
Does not signal ECU system 







Detects open/closed state 
of the fuel door or hood. 
Localized 
Impact 
Damaged components leak 
flammable gas. 
6 Puncture of 
hood or door 
6 36 
    
Electrical 
Short 
Does not signal ECU system 









Regulates fuel pressure at 
the outlet of each tank to a 
lower pressure. 
Deformation Allows over-pressure of lower 




    Cracking Leaks large volume of high 




HV Battery Pack 
(BP) 
274-Volt NiMH battery 
pack consisting of modules 
connected in series. 
Electrical 
Short 
Electrifies other components with 













Monitors system pressures 
and temperatures and 
actuates tank shut valves. 
Miscalibration Does not activate safety devices 








Does not activate safety devices 






    Electrical 
Short 
Does not activate safety devices 





Water Pump Circulates coolant between 
the fuel cell, hydrogen 
pump and radiators. 
Deformation Possible ignition source and 





  Cracking Possible ignition source and 





    Electrical 
Short 
Possible ignition source and 





Tank Shut Valve 
Mechanism 
Shuts off fuel flow from 
each tank with normally 
closed solenoid. 






Corrosion Does not shut down fuel flow, 
allowing high pressure 
flammable gas leak. 




  Deformation Does not shut down fuel flow, 
allowing high pressure 




    Electrical 
Short 
Premature valve closing. 1 ECU 
malfunction 
2 2 
Electric Motor 3 Phase AC permanent 
magnet electric motor 
contained in the transaxle. 
Driven by the PCU and 
used to power the vehicle 








  Torque 
Fatigue 
Mechanical failure. 5 Excessive 
loading 
4 20 
  Corrosion Mechanical failure. 5 exposure to 
acid 
3 15 




Hydrogen Pump Circulates H2 through the 
fuel cell. 
Deformation Possible ignition source and 




  Cracking Possible ignition source and 




    Electrical 
Short 
Possible ignition source and 




Fuel Cell (FC) Utilizes H2 and O2 from 




Possible ignition source in 





Cracking Leaks flammable gas and 




    Contamination Engine loses energy. 1 Dirty fuel 9 9 
Hydrogen 
Sensors 




Does not signal ECU system 
shutdown when hydrogen 
accumulation causes explosive 





    
Miscalibration Does not signal ECU system 
shutdown when hydrogen 
accumulation causes explosive 




BP High Voltage 
Fuse 
Provides short circuit 










FC and BP 
Electric Relays 
Stops electric flow from 
both the fuel cell and the 
HV battery pack. 
Electrical 
Short 
Does not prevent component 










Cables (with GFI) 
Carries high voltage DC 
between the PCU and the 










Converts DC current to 3 












Carries 3 phase AC 
between PCU and 
components in the motor 
compartment along with 
the hydrogen pump. 
Electrical 
Short 




Air Pump Pumps air to the fuel cell. Deformation Possible ignition source. 2 Excessive 
loading 
5 10 
  Cracking Possible ignition source. 2 Excessive 
loading 
5 10 
    Electrical 
Short 





Monitors for high voltage 
leakage to the metal 
chassis while the vehicle is 




Does not prevent component 
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